Supreme Court Denies Bail To Umar Khalid & Sharjeel Imam; Grants Bail To 5 Others In Delhi Riots Larger Conspiracy Case

The Supreme Court has refused bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, while granting bail to five co‑accused: Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa‑ur‑Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmad.​​

On 5 January 2026, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the 2020 Delhi riots “larger conspiracy” case arising from FIR 59/2020, denying bail to activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam but directing the release on bail of five co‑accused—Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa‑ur‑Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmad—who are also charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) and the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Court held that the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses a prima facie “central and formative role” for Khalid and Imam in an alleged phased conspiracy, involving planning, mobilisation, formation and use of WhatsApp groups (MSJ, JCC, DPSG etc.), fund‑raising, and strategic deployment of chakka‑jams that allegedly escalated into organised violence in North‑East Delhi in February 2020. Relying on Section 43D(5) UAPA and precedents like Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, the bench concluded that the statutory bar on bail is attracted for them, though it allowed them to renew bail pleas after examination of protected witnesses or after one year. In contrast, while upholding the gravity of the overall conspiracy, the Court treated the roles of Fatima, Haider, Shifa‑ur‑Rehman, Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmad as qualitatively lesser—largely logistical, financial or local‑operational rather than conceptual or command‑level—and therefore compatible with conditional liberty subject to stringent bail conditions, without treating the order as a precedent diluting UAPA standards.​​

2. Legal provisions relied on

1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 2(o) (Definition of “unlawful activity”)
   • Text : “‘unlawful activity’, in relation to an individual or association, means any action taken by such individual or association (whether by committing an act or by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise),— (i) which is intended, or supports any claim, to bring about, on any ground whatsoever, the cession of a part of the territory of India or the secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union, or which incites any individual or group of individuals to bring about such cession or secession; or (ii) which disclaims, questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; or (iii) which causes or is intended to cause disaffection against India.”​
   • Simple explanation: This defines unlawful activity to include acts or speech intending secession, disruption of sovereignty or disaffection against India.
   • Relevance: The prosecution narrative seeks to situate certain speeches, pamphlets and protest strategies of the accused within this broad definition as part of a larger anti‑state conspiracy.​
2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 15 (Terrorist act)
   • Text  (relevant part): “Whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,— (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological, radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause— (i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or (ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or (iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or (iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary and the offence is committed with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the sovereignty or integrity of India or to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country, is said to commit a terrorist act.”​
   • Simple explanation: Section 15 covers acts intended or likely to threaten national security or strike terror, including by disrupting essential services or causing serious violence or damage.
   • Relevance: The charge that the alleged conspiracy used coordinated chakka‑jams, targeted blockades and violence to paralyse Delhi and disrupt essential services is framed as a “terrorist act” under this provision.​​
3. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 18 (Punishment for conspiracy, etc.)
   • Text : “Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directly or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”​
   • Simple explanation: This criminalises not only terrorist acts themselves but also conspiracy, preparation, abetment and facilitation.
   • Relevance: The “larger conspiracy” theory and the allocation of planning versus execution roles among different accused are analysed under this section.​​
4. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 43D(5) (Restriction on bail)
   • Text : “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”​
   • Simple explanation: Courts must refuse bail in serious UAPA cases if, after looking at the police record, there are reasonable grounds to believe the accusations are prima facie true.
   • Relevance: This is the core statutory embargo the Supreme Court held to be attracted for Khalid and Imam, but not, in the same way, for the five co‑accused granted bail.​​
5. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 120B (Criminal conspiracy)
   • Text  (relevant part): “(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, [imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.”​
   • Simple explanation: Section 120B punishes agreement to commit serious offences, treating conspirators similarly to abettors.
   • Relevance: The entire “larger conspiracy” case is structured around an alleged multi‑phased criminal conspiracy under this provision, intertwined with UAPA counts.​​
6. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302, 307, 147–151, 153A, 295A, 436 etc. (selected riot/violence offences)
   • Text (illustrative verbatim):
     • Section 302: “Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine.”
     • Section 307 (relevant part): “Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.”
     • Section 147: “Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”​
   • Simple explanation: These IPC provisions criminalise murder, attempt to murder, rioting and other violent acts associated with communal riots.
   • Relevance: The factual matrix of killings, injuries, arson and destruction of property during the North‑East Delhi riots is prosecuted through these sections alongside UAPA counts.​​
7. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 437 & 439 (Bail in non‑bailable offences)
   • Text (verbatim – essence): Section 437 regulates when Magistrates may grant bail in non‑bailable cases, including factors like nature and gravity of the offence, previous convictions, and likelihood of tampering with evidence; Section 439 confers special powers on the High Court and Court of Session to grant bail, including imposing conditions.​
   • Simple explanation: These provisions set the general bail framework, subject in UAPA cases to the overriding special restriction under Section 43D(5).
   • Relevance: The Supreme Court balances the ordinary “triple test” (flight risk, tampering, reoffending) under CrPC with the stricter UAPA standard in determining which accused may be released.​​
8. Constitution of India – Article 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(2) and Article 21
   • Text (verbatim – extracts):
     • Article 19(1)(a): “All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression;”
     • Article 19(1)(b): “All citizens shall have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms;”
     • Article 19(2): “Nothing in sub‑clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub‑clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”
     • Article 21: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”​
   • Simple explanation: These provisions guarantee speech, protest and personal liberty, subject to reasonable restrictions and fair legal procedure.
   • Relevance: The case squarely raises the tension between protest rights and anti‑terror enforcement, and between prolonged pre‑trial incarceration and personal liberty.​​

3. Core legal topic

Core topic: Bail standards under UAPA, conspiracy liability and the boundary between protest, unlawful assembly and “terrorist” activity.

4. Contextual understanding

The legal treatment of protest‑related violence in India has long evolved through public order and sedition jurisprudence under the IPC, but post‑2004 UAPA amendments shifted the centre of gravity towards specialised anti‑terror law. The legislative intent behind expanding Section 15 and introducing stringent bail restrictions in Section 43D(5) was to enable pre‑emptive incapacitation of those allegedly involved in terror conspiracies, even at preparatory stages, while ostensibly preserving judicial scrutiny through the prima facie true threshold. Constitutionally, Article 19 jurisprudence—particularly decisions like Shreya Singhal and Kedar Nath Singh—seeks to protect political dissent and protest unless there is incitement to violence or tendency to create public disorder, but UAPA’s broad language often tests these limits. Globally, comparable tensions exist in counter‑terror regimes such as the UK’s Terrorism Acts and US material support statutes, where courts grapple with preparatory offences and low evidentiary thresholds in bail and sentencing. The Delhi riots conspiracy prosecutions thus sit within a wider comparative pattern of states framing certain protest‑linked activities as security threats, raising recurrent questions about proportionality, over‑breadth and the risk of chilling legitimate dissent.​​

5. Judicial interpretation

Indian courts have progressively articulated doctrines for bail under special statutes like UAPA which depart from ordinary criminal law by prioritising security and preventive logic over the presumption of liberty. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, the Supreme Court held that at the bail stage under Section 43D(5) UAPA, courts must not evaluate evidence meticulously but only see whether accusations are prima facie true on a broad reading of the charge‑sheet and case diary, effectively raising the bar for release. Subsequent decisions, including Gurvinder Singh and Thwaha Fasal, affirmed that the special embargo operates in addition to, and not in derogation of, the standard “triple test” for bail, while also cautioning that mere association, without concrete acts, cannot automatically attract terrorist‑offence liability. In the uploaded judgment, the Supreme Court traces the trial court and Delhi High Court findings that depict a multi‑phase conspiracy beginning in December 2019, moving from mobilisation and pamphleteering to coordinated chakka‑jams and eventual communal violence, and places Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam “at the apex” as ideologues and planners. The Court recounts the High Court’s reliance on protected‑witness statements, electronic evidence, WhatsApp groups (MSJ, JCC, DPSG) and alleged meetings at Jangpura, Jamia, Shaheen Bagh, Gandhi Peace Foundation and Seelampur to infer conspiratorial intent beyond mere dissent. As to Sharjeel Imam, the judgment summarises submissions that his speeches and organisational work were primarily protest‑related, contrasted with the prosecution’s portrayal of him as a “principal ideologue” whose chakka‑jam strategy allegedly anticipated violent escalation, with the trial court and High Court both holding that Section 43D(5) barred bail by treating this material as prima facie satisfying Section 15 and 18 UAPA. Regarding Umar Khalid, the Court recites the prosecution narrative of him as “principal conspirator”, from the early formation of MSJ and CAB Team groups to subsequent meetings, creation of JCC and DPSG, speeches at Amravati, and alleged directions to convert sit‑ins into disruptive blockades leading to riots and attacks on police, reaffirming lower‑court conclusions that his role crosses the prima facie threshold. In contrast, for Shifa‑ur‑Rehman and Mohd. Saleem Khan, the judgment notes that trial and High Court orders framed them primarily as financier‑organiser and local executor, respectively, but the Supreme Court’s own discussion (in the attached document) tends to stress that their roles are derivative, logistics‑focused and operational rather than command‑level, and that prolonged pre‑trial detention absent ongoing necessity risks conflating punitive and preventive detention. This leads the Court to emphasise that conspiracy cases require systemic evidence, but that systemic allegations do not automatically justify continued incarceration for actors whose capacity to repeat or escalate violence is not presently substantiated, thereby opening conceptual space for granting them bail with strict conditions.​​

6. Critical analysis context

The legal framework’s strength lies in recognising the seriousness of organised violence and ensuring robust tools to address complex conspiracies, yet the combination of broad UAPA definitions and a stringent bail embargo risks normalising prolonged incarceration on the basis of untested allegations. Judicial reasoning that repeatedly characterises speech, organisational work and digital coordination as part of a terrorism‑linked conspiracy may blur the line between protected dissent and criminal conduct, especially where trials are lengthy and evidentiary disputes remain unresolved. At the same time, the present judgment’s differentiated treatment of central planners and peripheral or operational actors, and its engagement with liberty concerns for the latter, indicate a nascent attempt to recalibrate practice within the existing statutory scheme. Nonetheless, significant gaps remain between constitutional commitments to free speech and speedy trial, and on‑ground realities of UAPA prosecutions and bail denials, which continue to raise civil liberties concerns.​​

7. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s refusal of bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam confirms that, in high‑profile UAPA prosecutions, central conspiracy‑related roles will attract the full force of Section 43D(5) even after several years of custody. By simultaneously granting bail to five co‑accused on the basis of comparatively limited and derivative roles, the Court signals a more granular, role‑sensitive approach within the rigid statutory framework. Practically, this may encourage trial courts to differentiate more carefully between conceptual architects, financiers, logistical coordinators and local executors when applying the bail embargo. The judgment also indicates that long incarceration, absence of continuing organisational capacity and compliance with earlier interim bail orders can tilt the balance towards conditional release for some accused. For Khalid and Imam, the possibility to renew bail after examination of protected witnesses or after one year creates a structured, though limited, pathway for future reconsideration. Going forward, the case is likely to influence UAPA bail litigation nationally, shape prosecutorial strategies in conspiracy‑based cases, and fuel ongoing debates on the compatibility of India’s counter‑terror law with constitutional guarantees of speech, protest and personal liberty.